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Abstract
This paper studies the risk-return proﬁle of centralized and decentralized banks. We
address the conditions that favor a particular lending regime while acknowledging
the effects on lending and returns caused by the course of the business cycle. To
analyze these issues, we develop a model which incorporates two stylized facts; (i)
banks in which lending decisions are decentralized tend to have a lower cost associ-
ated with screening potential borrowers and (ii) decentralized decision-making may
generate inefﬁcient outcomes because of lack of coordination. Simulations are used
to compare the two banking regimes. Among the results, it is found that asymmetric
markets (in terms of the proportion of high ability entrepreneurs) tend to favor cen-
tralized banking while decentralized banks seem better at lending in the wake of an
economic downturn (high probability of a recession). In addition, we ﬁnd that even
though a bank group where decisions are decentralized may end up with a portfolio
of loans which is (relatively) poorly diversiﬁed between regions, the ability to effec-
tively screen potential borrowers may nevertheless give a decentralized bank a lower
overall risk in the lending portfolio than when decisions are centralized.
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An important aspect of a bank’s lending activity is the ability to assess the risk-return
proﬁle of its investments. Failure to do so may result in substantial credit losses in the
case of an unanticipated event. A recent example is the subprime crisis of 2008 where the
ﬁve largest U.S. investment banks either went bankrupt, were taken over by other com-
panies or were bailed out by the U.S. government. Although nearly all banks suffered
from reduced proﬁtability during this period, there was a large variation between banks
in terms of how exposed their balance sheets were to risky credits/investments and how
large losses they actually experienced during the crisis. Partly, these differences may re-
ﬂect differences in corporate culture and different attitudes towards risk but since banks
are forced to deal with excessive information asymmetry problems, such differences may
also reﬂect the superiority of some banks in assessing the risk proﬁles and probabilities of
default within their respective pools of potential clients and investment opportunities.
A natural question is then why some banks seem to be more effective than others in
limiting their credit losses when hit by a negative shock. In this paper we argue that a
potentially important factor is whether lending/investment decisions are decentralized
(meaning that the lending decisions are taken at the local branch level) or centralized
(meaning that the lending decisions are taken higher up in the organization). The pur-
pose of this paper is to develop a stylized theoretical model to analyze this issue.
Our paper relates to the relatively new strand in the corporate ﬁnance literature deal-
ing with organizational structure. In this ﬁeld, an important question is how effective
different organizational structures are in terms of handling intangible “soft information”
(e.g., ability, honesty, etc.) and “hard information” (e.g., data form credit scoring mod-
els and balance sheet data).1 However, the effects of organizational structure on a bank’s
risk-return proﬁle have not yet been studied and this is the focus of this paper. To address
this issue, we develop a model that allows us to study the potential trade-off that a bank
may face between (i) being effective in terms of selecting high-quality clients (which is
achieved by having a decentralized decision-making structure) and (ii) being effective in
terms of ending up with a well diversiﬁed portfolio of loans on the aggregate level (which
is achieved by having a more centralized decision-making structure). We also take into
1Stein (2002) contrasted decentralized and centralized (hierarchical) ﬁrms from an internal capital mar-
kets perspective. He found that hierarchical ﬁrms are better suited to deal with hard information since such
information is easily handed upwards in the hierarchy whereas decentralized ﬁrms handle soft information
more effectively. Takáts (2004), in turn, focused exclusively on the difference between centralized and decen-
tralized banks in terms of their abilities to handle soft information and he found (among other things) that
information asymmetries are especially important in small business lending.
2account that a possible consequence of decentralized decision-making is that the decision-
maker in one local branch may not recognize that his/her choices may affect the situation
for the other local branches. As such, local decision-making may generate “externalities”
within the bank group. Here we will focus on (iii) ﬁnancing externalities, which occur
if the decision on how many loans to grant in one local branch affects the cost of raising
funds in other branches within the bank group.
Point (i) can be motivated from two perspectives. On one hand, it is well known
that banks screen and monitor potential borrowers (Allen, 1990; Winton, 1995) in order
to reduce their exposure to counter party risk. In this context, the concept of relationship
banking has been put forward as an effective strategy (at least in the longer term) to har-
vest the information needed to attain high-quality clients (see Boot, 2000, for an excellent
review on relationship banking). The underlying concept in relationship banking is to de-
velop comprehensive working relations with each client by assessing his/her individual
situation. This means that a bank practicing relationship banking has the ability to col-
lect intangible soft information about the potential client which may improve the bank’s
client quality estimates (Petersen, 2004), thereby increasing the bank’s ability to discrim-
inate between good and bad clients. We will refer to this discrimination procedure as
client targeting. Typically, relationship banking is associated with small banks, or large
banks that have a decentralized decision-making structure. One rationale for this is that
managers of small banks, and branch managers of decentralized banks, have a greater au-
tonomy over adjudication and lending decisions (Stein, 2002). As such, branch managers
in decentralized banks have a strong incentive to act on soft information. In contrast,
branch managers in centralized banks tend to rely more on hard information (Canales
and Nanda, 2011) which means that their incentive to act on soft information may be less
strong compared with their decentralized counterparts.
Another explanation for why decentralized banks tend to rely more on relationship
banking than centralized banks is that soft information is hard to quantify (Petersen,
2004). This implies that soft information gathered through a relationship with a client
may not easily be communicated along the chain of command within a centralized bank,
especially if the communication relies on formalized procedures such as score sheets, etc.
We will refer to this as information erosion and a consequence of this potential failure
to communicate effectively is that a multi-layered centralized bank needs to put in more
effort to maintain the quality of the soft information that has been gathered. This adds an
extra cost to the client targeting activity in a centralized organizational structure.
A consequence of the arguments presented above is that decentralized banks are likely
to put in more effort into screening their potential customers than do centralized banks
andthis issupported by empiricalﬁndings. Liberti(2009) found that thetransmission and
3reliance of soft information is larger in a decentralized organizational structure, whereas
Berger et al. (2005) found that small banks tend to have a comparative advantage in pro-
cessing soft information. As such, small and decentralized banks may be better at allevi-
ating credit constraints for small businesses (Stein, 2002) and they are likely to lend more
heavily to small and opaque ﬁrms, as previously suggested by Berger et al. (2001, 2005).
Further, a recent study by Uchida et al. (2008) on Japanese data, conﬁrmed the ﬁndings
of Berger et al. (2005), suggesting that the comparative advantage in relationship lending
experienced by small banks, is likely to be universal.
Point(ii)isrelatedtoportfoliodiversiﬁcation(inthespiritofMarkowitz,1952)whereby
large banks are able to ﬁnance a wider range of ﬁrms (Takáts, 2004) than small banks.
Here the argument is that under decentralized decision-making, the aggregate portfolio
of clients that the bank group as a whole ends up with (which is the sum of the portfo-
lios of loans over all local branches in the bank group) need not be as well diversiﬁed
between regions as it might have been if the lending decisions where made at the cen-
tral level. For example, if the local branch in one region ends up with a small portfolio
of clients (because the local bank ofﬁce predicts that the overall quality of the potential
borrowers in that region is low) whereas the local branch in another region ends up with
a large portfolio of clients (because the local bank ofﬁce predicts that the overall quality
of the potential borrowers in that region is high), then the bank’s aggregate portfolio has
a heavy weight on lending in the other region. Depending on how the bank proﬁt in the
ﬁrst region correlates with the bank proﬁt in the other region, the bank group’s aggregate
portfolio of clients/investment projects need not be “optimal” in terms of risk diversiﬁ-
cation between the two regions. By referring to this as aggregate portfolio risk, it follows
that a bank which has a decentralized decision-making structure may lack the ability to
diversify effectively between regions. However, this problem need not arise in a bank
with a centralized decision-making structure since centralized lending decisions makes it
possible for the central management to take the aggregate portfolio risk into account.
Turning to point (iii), a ﬁnancing externality may arise if the bank group’s cost of ﬁ-
nancing is an increasing function of the total amount of funds that needs to be raised
within the bank group. For example, this may reﬂect that the supply of deposits is an
increasing function of the interest paid by the bank group. Under decentralized decision-
making, each local branch may fail to recognize that its need to raise funds will affect the
borrowing cost for the other branches. This creates an externality within the bank group
which will lead to a too high borrowing cost from the perspective of the bank group as a
whole.
The arguments underpinning points (i) - (iii) suggests a potential trade-off between,
on one hand, effective client targeting and on the other hand aggregate portfolio risk and







Figure 1: Logarithmic scaled plot of the historical U.S. recession probabilities from a
dynamic-factor markov-switching model as in Chauvet and Piger (2008).
ﬁnancing externalities. These trade-offs are likely to be intrinsically related to the orga-
nizational structure of a bank. Acknowledging this, we develop a theoretical banking
model which incorporates the speciﬁc characteristics that are unique for a centralized and
a decentralized bank respectively. Due to the complexity of the model, we use simulations
to determine under what circumstances, and to what extent, the trade-offs presented in
points (i) - (iii) work in favor of a centralized or a decentralized organizational structure.
The key issue that we focus on is which type of organizational structure that tends
to perform better in terms of producing lower risk and higher proﬁts (or lower losses)
when the economy is hit by a recession. Since the probability of a recession varies over
the business cycle, as illustrated in Figure 1, and since the probability of ﬁrm default is
highly dependent on which phase of the business cycle the economy is in (see Helwege
and Kleiman (1997), Fridson et al. (1997) and Carey (1998) among others), the risk as-
sociated with a given credit portfolio will change over the course of the business cycle,
thereby inﬂuencing the bank’s lending decisions.
In the simulations, we acknowledge the business cycle and calculate the actual prof-
its/losses if a recession or a boom actually occurs. This allows us to study whether a bank
which has chosen a lending strategy which will produce high expected proﬁts if the econ-
omy is expected to boom, will suffer relatively larger losses if this prediction turns on its
head and the actual outcome is a recession.
5The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy present the outline of
the model. This is followed by a characterization of the borrowers in Section 3 and a char-
acterization of the bank’s problem in Section 4. The simulation results are presented in
Section 5 and the paper is concluded in Section 6.
2 Outline of the Model
Consider an economy (country) that is made up of two regions, 1 and 2. Each region
is populated by a large number of entrepreneurs who need to borrow funds to ﬁnance
risky projects. At the national level there is a bank group which has a local branch in each
region that supplies funds to a selected group of entrepreneurs in each region.
The timing of events is as follows. In period 1, each entrepreneur contacts the regional
(local) bank ofﬁce and applies for a loan. At the same instant, the bank evaluates the
quality of the potential borrowers and, based on this evaluation, decides on the number of
applicants eligible for credit. In period 2, the rates of returns of the entrepreneurs projects
are realized which, in turn, determines the performance of the debt and the bank’s proﬁt.2
3 The Entrepreneurs
Eachentrepreneurhasaprojectwhich requiresaninitialandindivisible investment ofone
dollar. Entrepreneurs differ in terms of ability and there are two ability types; high-ability
(h) and low-ability (l) entrepreneurs. The proportions of h- and l-types in the population
of entrepreneurs in region k = 1,2 are θk (high-ability) and 1 − θk (low-ability). Ability is
not known before (ex ante) the enterprise is set up which means that in period 1, when
an entrepreneur applies for funds to make the investment, neither the entrepreneur nor
the bank knows the true ability of the entrepreneur.3 This uncertainty will be referred
to as ability risk. Ability is revealed (ex post) in period 2 when the rate of return on the
investment is realized.
2This means that our model abstracts from the possible information advantages associated with repeated
lending, see Sharpe (1990); Rajan (1992); Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) among others.
3From an entrepreneur’s perspective this uncertainty reﬂects that before the enterprise is set up, the en-
trepreneur does not know exactly what qualities are required to be successful in the business. Hence, even
though each entrepreneur potentially knows his/her skills, the entrepreneur does not know which skills are
important for being successful in the business. The bank, in turn, can be viewed as having had prior expe-
rience with ﬁrms in the business. As such, the bank knows what qualities are required to be successful but
the bank’s problem is that some of these qualities are intangible (e.g., social competence, self conﬁdence, ef-
fectiveness in handling stress, etc.) which cannot be determined without putting in some effort to learn more
about the potential client.
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Figure 2: The projects’ rate of return.
We let the projects’ rate of return depend on whether the business cycle in period 2
features a boom, a recession or is somewhere in between these two extremes (henceforth
referred to as a “normal” state). To model this market risk, we assume that with probabil-
ities pu, pn and pd the economy is in a boom (or upstate, u), in a normal state (n) or in a
recession (or downstate, d), such that pu + pn + pd = 1. Conditional on market condition
j (j = u,n,d) realized in period 2, the project rate of return, r
i,j
k , for an entrepreneur of
ability type i (i = h,l) in region k is illustrated in Figure 2.
Therearetwobasicassumptionsunderlyingthispay-offtree; high-abilityentrepreneurs
will never default on their loans whereas low-ability entrepreneurs will not be able to pay
back the loan with full interest unless the economy is booming. This is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2 by incorporating the interest rate, ˆ rb
k, which is the interest rate charged by the bank
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k whereas the second implies r
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These two assumptions capture the essence of the empirically observed relationship be-
tween ﬁrm defaults and the phase of the business (see Helwege and Kleiman, 1997; Frid-
son et al., 1997; Carey, 1998, among others).
Note here that the rate of return is negative for l-entrepreneurs if the market condi-
7tion is n or d. More speciﬁcally, if market condition n occurs, then the rate of low ability
entrepreneur is r
l,n
k . Since ˆ rb
k > r
l,n
k > −1 (as illustrated in Figure 2), the bank has ﬁrst pri-
ority on the rest value of an l-entrepreneur’s ﬁrm, which is given by 1+ r
n,l
k . On the other
hand, if market condition d occurs, then the rate of low ability entrepreneur is −1 > r
l,d
k ,
in which case the bank’s loss on the loan provided to an l-entrepreneur is 100 percent.
Wenormalizeeachentrepreneur’sinitialendowmentofresourcestozerowhichmeans
that each entrepreneur needs to ﬁnance his/her investment by borrowing from the bank.
Since each entrepreneur is oblivious about his/her ability type, and acknowledging that
each entrepreneur needs one dollar to undertake the investment, the expected proﬁt,
E(πk), evaluated in period 1 for an arbitrary entrepreneur in region k is given by:





= E(rk) − rb
k, (1)
where:
E(rk) = pu · Eu (rk) + pn · En (rk) + pd · Ed (rk)
Eu (rk) = θk · r
h,u
k + (1− θk) · r
l,u
k
En (rk) = θk · r
h,n
k + (1− θk) · r
l,n
k
Ed (rk) = θk · r
h,d
k + (1− θk) · r
l,d
k .
Here, E(rk) is the unconditional expected rate of return of investing one dollar in an ar-
bitrary entrepreneur’s enterprise before ability and market condition have been revealed,
whereas Ei (rk) is the expected value of rk conditional on the economy being is in state i.
As such, the upper branch in the pay-off tree in Figure 2 reﬂects the market risk associated
with investing one dollar in the enterprise whereas the lower branch captures the ability
risk.
From equation (1), it follows that potential entrepreneurs will apply for loans as long
as E(rk) − rb
k ≥ 0 which means that this condition can be viewed as a participation con-
straint on behalf of the entrepreneurs. The interest rate which makes the entrepreneur’s
expected proﬁt in equation (1) equal to zero is denoted ˆ rb
k. As such, ˆ rb
k is exogenously
determined by the parameters appearing in equation (1). In the simulations we set the


















As mentioned above, the entrepreneurs contact the bank in period 1 to apply for loans.
Since the bank cannot observe the true ability of an individual entrepreneur, it will screen
theapplicantstoobtainanestimateoftheirability. Inthisprocesspotential h-entrepreneurs
are sorted into the pool of borrowers whereas potential l-entrepreneurs are discarded. If
the bank would not collect any background information about the applicants, this pro-
cess would be a random draw where the expected proportion of h-entrepreneurs in the
pool of borrowers in region k would be given by θk. However, by putting in some ef-
fort, ek, to collect information about an applicant, the bank can detect and sort away some
l-entrepreneurs, thereby increasing the proportion of h-entrepreneurs in the pool of bor-
rowers. Here, the characteristics of an individual applicant can be used as predictors of
ability, and the more information that is collected about an applicant, the better the pre-
diction. Hence, the more effort that is put into the screening process, the larger will be
the proportion, zk = z(ek), of true h-entrepreneurs in the pool of borrowers in region
k. The proportion of l-entrepreneurs who are incorrectly sorted into this pool is then
given by 1 − z(ek). Observe that the bank does not know the true ability of any given
entrepreneur in the pool of borrowers. The sorting just increases the probability that any
given entrepreneur in the pool is of high-ability. As such, the possibility to eliminate some
l-entrepreneurs from the list of applicants can be viewed as changing the distribution of
entrepreneurs from which the bank draws a sample when it lend funds. We require that
the function zk = z(ek) satisﬁes the following conditions:
z′ (ek) > 0, z(0) = θk, lim
ek→∞
z(ek) = 1.
The ﬁrst two properties follow from the discussion above, whereas the third reﬂects that
for ﬁnite levels of effort, there will always be a random element in the sorting of agents
into the pool of borrowers. A functional form that satisﬁes the criteria laid out above, and
which will be used in the simulations, is:
z(ek) = θk + q(ek) · (1− θk),
where:
q(ek) = 1− exp(−ek).
We let 0 ≤ ek < ∞ such that the function q(ek) lies in the interval [0,1].
To determine how many applicants, Mk, that needs to be screened in region k to obtain
a pool of borrowers in which the expected proportion of h-entrepreneurs is z(ek), observe
ﬁrst that, conditional on the level of z(ek), the expected number of true h-entrepreneurs
9within the pool of Nk borrowers is given by z(ek)· Nk. We now ask the following question:
from the population of entrepreneurs in region k, where the proportion of high-ability
entrepreneurs is θk, how many applicants must be screened in order to obtain z(ek) · Nk
high-ability entrepreneurs? The answer4 is obtained by setting z(ek) · Nk equal to θk · Mk.





Equation (2) shows that (i) the larger the bank requires the proportion of high ability
entrepreneurs (zk) to be within the pool of borrowers, (ii) the lower the proportion of
high-ability entrepreneurs (θk) is within the population and (iii) the more loans (Nk) the
bank wants to provide, the larger will be the number of persons that needs to be screened.
Since the effort put into screening a potential borrower in region k is ek, it follows that
the total screening effort made by the bank in region k is given by ek · Mk. The cost of this
screening effort in region k is an increasing and (weakly) convex function Sk (·), where
S′
k (·) > 0 and S′′
k (·) ≥ 0. In the simulations, we use a quadratic functional form:
Sk (ek · Mk) = αk,1 · (ek · Mk) + αk,2 · (ek · Mk)
2 , (3)
where αk,1 > 0 and αk,2 ≥ 0 are parameters which capture the regional bank’s cost effec-
tiveness of handling intangible soft information. Since empirical studies have found that
small and decentralized banks rely more heavily on soft information (Liberti, 2009) and
since soft information may be hard to quantify (Petersen, 2004), it is reasonable to assume
that centralized banks are subject to an additional screening cost when they move the
information upwards in the hierarchy. In terms of our model framework, this indicates
that the marginal cost of effort is lower under decentralized banking such that decen-
tralized banks will but more effort into building relationships than do their centralized
counterparts. This assumption basically reﬂects that, the shorter the chain of command is
within the bank, the lower the cost of obtaining and transmitting information through the
bank hierarchy. As such, we assume that S′
k (·) is lower for a decentralized bank (working
through lower values of αk,1 and αk,2) than in a bank where the decisions are centralized.
In the discussions below, we will refer to this as decentralized banks being more cost efﬁ-
cient with respect to screening than centralized banks.
We now characterize the bank’s pay-off, Rk, of lending one dollar to an entrepreneur
in region k. The pay-off of the loan is the amount the bank actually receives in period 2
4Recall that the screening process detects and eliminates l-entrepreneurs from the pool of borrowers.
Therefore, among the Mk agents who are screened, no h-entrepreneurs are lost which means that the ex-
pected number of h-entrepreneurs, θk · Mk, is unchanged in the screening process.
10when borrower default is taken into account. From Figure 2, it follows that if the bank
charges the interest rate ˆ rb













k = 1+ r
l,n




Given this pay-off structure, and conditional on ek, the expected pay-off of lending one





















Let us now turn to the bank’s proﬁt. Since we focus on the effects of organizational
structure, we keep the model as simple as possible and assume that the accounting iden-
tity for the bank at the national level is written:
D + E = N. (4)
Equation (4) shows that the bank group’s total liabilities are made up of private equity, E,
and total deposits, D, whereas total assets are made up of the amount of loans issued in
the two regions, N = N1 + N2. Cash reserves are normalized to zero. Private equity is
exogenously given and in the following, we will normalize E to be zero, which means that
D = N1+ N2. The supply of deposits are an increasingfunction of the interest ratepaid by
the bank, ρ, henceforth referred to as the bank’s ﬁnancing rate. The positive relationship
between ρ and D reﬂects that the bank has to pay a larger interest rate to attract more
depositors. Hence ρ′ (D) > 0, and in the simulations we use a quadratic form for this
function:
ρ(D) = b1 · D + b2 · D2,
where b1 > 0 and b2 ≥ 0 are two exogenously given parameters that determine the bank’s














Rk,m for k = 1,2.
We can use equations (2) and (5) to write the expected proﬁt as:
E(Π) = E(Π1) + E(Π2),
11where:
E(Π1) = N1 · E( ¯ R1) − S1
!
e1 · z(e1) · N1
θ1
"
− [1+ ρ(N1 + N2)] · N1
E(Π2) = N2 · E( ¯ R2) − S2
!
e2 · z(e2) · N2
θ2
"
− [1+ ρ(N1 + N2)] · N2.
4.1 Objective Function and Measures of Risk
We allow the bank to care both about the expected proﬁt and the volatility of proﬁt, where
the latter is a measure of the risk associated with lending. The question is what measure
of volatility to use to capture risk? One approach is to follow the bulk of the ﬁnance
literature and use the variance of the proﬁt. This implies that we can write the bank
group’s risk-adjusted expected proﬁt as:
Ω = E(Π1) + E(Π2) −
1
2
· A · Var(Π), (5)
where:
Var(Π) = Var(Π1) + Var(Π2) + 2· Cov(Π1,Π2) (6)
Var(Πk) = E[Πk − E(Πk)]
2 for k = 1,2
Cov(Π1,Π2) = E[(Π1 − E(Π1)) · (Π2 − E(Π2))],
and where A ≥ 0 reﬂects the degree of risk-aversion. If A = 0, the bank is risk-neutral
whereas a level of A > 0 indicates risk aversion. As such, the parameter A can be viewed
as reﬂecting the risk culture within the bank group. The measure Var(Πk) will be referred
to as the total risk in region k whereas Var(Π) is the total risk within the bank group.
These risk measures can be decomposed according to:
total risk = market risk+ ability risk
Var(Πk) = Varm (Πk) + Vara (Πk),
where the market risk Varm (Πk) is the variance associated with the ﬁrst leg in Figure 2 in
region k whereas the ability risk Vara (Πk) is the variance associated with the second leg
in Figure 2 in region k.
Another approach frequently used in the ﬁnance literature is to incorporate the down-
sidevariance(alsoreferredtoasthesemivariance)asameasureofrisk. Inthesimulations,
we have used both the variance and various semivariance measures as indicators of risk
and they produce the same qualitative results. Therefore, when we present the results
from the simulations, we only show the results associated with the variance of proﬁts as
a measure of risk.
124.2 Organizational Structure
Let us now characterize the choices made within the bank group. As mentioned earlier,
we will consider two different organizational structures; centralized and decentralized
banking.
4.2.1 Centralized Banking
In terms of this model, centralized banking implies that all decisions are taken at the
national level. This means that the objective function coincides with equation (5). Thus,
by using equation (5) and (6), we can write the centralized bank’s objective function as:
ΩC = Ω1 + Ω2 − A · Cov(Π1,Π2), (7)
where super-index C stands for “centralized” and where:
Ωk = E(Πk) −
1
2
· A · Var(Πk) for k = 1,2, (8)







. However, from the entrepreneurial participation constraint in
equation (1) it follows that rb
k cannot exceed E(rk) and this constraint will be binding, i.e.
ˆ rb
k = E(rk). This means that the actual decision variables are (e1, N1) and (e2, N2). This
also applies under decentralized banking.
4.2.2 Decentralized Banking
Under decentralized banking, all decisions are taken at the regional level which means
that the local bank in region k chooses the policy vector (ek, Nk) while it treats the choices
made by the local bank in the other region as exogenous. From this perspective, the two
local banks play a non-cooperative Nash game vis-a-vis each other. The only thing that
takes place at the central level is the ﬁnancing. This is assumed to work as follows. Once
the local bank has determined Nk, the local bank ofﬁce requests the central level of the
bank to arrange the funds that are needed to lend the required amount. Hence, the funds
that the bank at the central level needs to raise is N = N1 + N2.
The objective function for the local bank in region k is the local risk-adjusted proﬁt
deﬁned in equation (8) which means that:
ΩDC
k = E(Πk) −
1
2
· A · Var(Πk), (9)
13where super-index DC stands for “decentralized”. Since the bank group’s risk culture
may be the same regardless of organizational structure, we assume that the parameter A
takes the same value in both banking regimes.
4.2.3 Centralized vs Decentralized Decision-Making
The decisions regarding lending and screening effort will differ between centralized and
decentralized banks and there are three basic reasons for this;
(i). Decentralized banks may be more cost efﬁcient with respect to screening than their
centralized counterparts. We call this the cost efﬁciency effect.
(ii). A centralized bank may be more efﬁcient in diversifying the lending portfolio be-
tween regions. We call this the diversiﬁcation effect.
(iIi). Decentralized decision-making may give rise to ﬁnancing externalities within the bank
group.
To see clearly how the cost efﬁciency effect, the diversiﬁcation effect and the ﬁnancing
externality cause the choices made by the bank in a centralized regime to differ from those
made by the bank in the decentralized regime, let us consider the bank’s optimal choice of
Nk in the two regimes. When the decisions are centralized and the bank’s objective func-
tion is ΩC, the ﬁrst order condition with respect to N1 becomes (the ﬁrst-order condition
for N2 is analogous):
∂ΩC
∂N1



















· (N1 + N2). (10)
On the other hand, when decisions are decentralized, then the local bank’s objective func-
tion is given by ΩDC
k . The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to N1 then becomes (the



















In equation (10), the function SC
1 is the cost function associated with screening under cen-
tralized banking whereas SDC
1 in equation (11) is the cost function associated with screen-
ing under decentralized banking. These cost functions differ because decentralized banks
may be more cost efﬁcient with respect to screening than their centralized counterparts.
14As mentioned earlier, the cost efﬁciency effect is incorporated into the model by setting
lower values of the parameters αk,1 and αk,2 in equation (3) for a decentralized bank than
for a bank where the decisions are centralized. As such, for given levels of e and N, it
follows that ∂SC
1 /∂N1 > ∂SDC
1 /∂N1. All else equal, this cost efﬁciency effect provides the
bank in the decentralized regime with an incentive to provide more loans than the bank
in the centralized regime.
Second, comparing the last term in the ﬁrst row of equation (10) with the correspond-
ing term in equation (11), we see that the effect of N1 on Cov(Π1,Π2) is present in equa-
tion (10) but absent in equation (11). The reason is that the risk-adjusted objective function
differs between the two banking regimes. Recall that when the decisions are centralized,
then the risk-adjusted proﬁt is given by equation (7), whereas when the decisions are de-
centralized, then each regional bank maximizes ΩDC
k which means that the risk-adjusted




As can be seen, equations (7) and (12) do not coincide and the difference lies in the fact
that when decisions are decentralized, the regional banks do not take into account the co-
variation between Π1 and Π2 when they make their decisions. If ∂Cov(Π1,Π2)/∂N1 > 0
(as one would normally expect) then this term will, all else equal, provide the bank in the
centralized regime with an incentive to provide fewer loans than the bank in the decen-
tralized regime (see equation (10)). This is the diversiﬁcation effect.
Third, equations (10) and (11) also differ with respect to the ﬁnal term in the second
row in each equation. In these equations, the ﬁnal term reﬂects that an increase in the
number of loans will lead to a higher cost per loan via a higher ﬁnancing rate (ρ). The
difference between the two banking regimes is that under decentralized decision-making,
thelocalbankonlyrecognizesthe effectof ahigher ﬁnancingrateonits loans, N1, whereas
under centralized decision-making, the bank takes into account the effects of a higher ﬁ-
nancing rate in both regions. Since the local bank in each region fails to recognize how
its decision affects the cost of lending in the other region, the local banks effectively im-
pose an externality upon each other when decisions are decentralized. All else equal, this
failure in coordination under decentralized decision-making will induce each local bank
to provide more loans than is optimal from the perspective of the bank group as a whole.
This is the ﬁnancing externality.
155 Simulations
Because of the difﬁculties associated with obtaining analytical solutions from the theoret-
ical model, we simulate outcomes using constrained numerical optimization.5 The pre-
sentation of our results will be divided into four parts. As for the ﬁrst three parts, we
know from the analysis above that the cost efﬁciency effect, the ﬁnancing externality and
the diversiﬁcation effect will inﬂuence decentralized (DC) decision-makers to choose dif-
ferent levels of e and N than centralized (C) decision-makers. Therefore, in Section 5.1 we
analyze the difference in outcomes between centralized and decentralized banking when
only the cost efﬁciency effect applies while the ﬁnancing externality and the diversiﬁca-
tion effect are made redundant. In Section 5.2, we instead analyze the behavior when only
the ﬁnancing externality is present while the cost efﬁciency effect and the diversiﬁcation
effect are made redundant and in Section 5.3, we look at the diversiﬁcation effect when
the cost efﬁciency effect and the ﬁnancing externality are made redundant. The parameter
values used in the simulations are presented in the Appendix.
Having worked out these isolated effects, we continue in Section 5.4 by analyzing the
full model, where the cost efﬁciency effect, the ﬁnancing externality and the diversiﬁca-
tioneffectsimultaneouslyinﬂuencethechoicesmadeundercentralizedanddecentralized
decision-making, respectively.
Inallsimulations, akeyquestion ishowthe outcomeinthe two bankingregimesdiffer
when the probability of a deep recession (which in this model corresponds to market
condition downstate) is increased. In the full model, we also analyze how the proﬁts in
the two banking regimes are affected if a “black swan” hits the economy. By that we
mean that a recession unexpectedly hits the economy, even though the initial probability
for such an event was low.
5.1 The Pure Cost Efﬁciency Effect
To isolate the cost efﬁciency effect we need to eliminate the diversiﬁcation effect and the
ﬁnancing externality from the model. To eliminate the former we set the degree of risk
aversion (A) equal to zero in equations (7) and (9). This means that the bank effectively
becomes risk-neutral in which case the incentive to diversify away risk is absent. To elim-
inate the ﬁnancing externality from the model, we allow each local branch in the bank
group to have a separate ﬁnancing function which is independent of the other branch’s
amount of borrowing. As a consequence, the ﬁnancing function in region k is given by
ρ(Nk) (instead of ρ(N1 + N2)). Having made these adjustments, only the cost efﬁciency
5Mathematica is used in the simulations. See the Appendix for details.
16Table 1: Summarized effects; pure cost efﬁciency effect.
(a) Implied relationships.
































$ (− then +) #
Var(ΠDC)
Var(ΠC)




effect (i.e. that αC
k > αDC
k in the screening cost function deﬁned in equation (3)) remains in
the model.
In Table 1, we summarize the results in the presence of the pure cost efﬁciency effect.
As can be seen in Table 1(a), the bank in the DC-regime chooses a higher screening effort
than the (less cost efﬁcient) bank in the C-regime which implies that the proportion of h-







A consequence of this is that the expected marginal revenue of an increase in N will (from
any given initial level) be larger under decentralized banking. This will induce the decen-
tralized bank to lend more funds (NDC > NC) than the centralized bank which causes the
expected proﬁt to be larger in the DC-regime (E(ΠDC) > (E(ΠC)). Observe, however,
that even though the portfolio of loans is larger under decentralized banking, the ability
to be more effective in terms of sorting out poor clients means that the risk (measured
both in terms of market risk and total risk) in the bank’s portfolio of loans is smaller un-
der decentralized banking than under centralized banking.
Next, recall from the introduction that the probability of a recession changes over the
course of the business cycle (see Figure 1). Let us therefore take a closer look at how the
two banking regimes’ optimal choices of e and N, and the resulting proﬁt and risk lev-
els, are affected by an increase in the probability that a recession will occur (pd). In our
simulations, the increase in pd is matched by a corresponding reduction in pu while pn is
unchanged. The effects are summarized in Table 1(b) and the direction of change in each
variable is indicated by the sign above the variable at hand. From Table 1(b), we see that
17when the probability of a recession increases, then the screening effort increases in both
regimes because it is now more important than before to eliminate “rotten eggs” from the
portfolio of loans. The increase in e is proportionally larger under centralized banking
which causes the ratio eDC/eC to decrease, but our simulations show that eDC will never-
theless exceed eC. In addition, the increase in pd has a negative effect on the number of
loans granted in both regimes. Here, NC is reduced proportionally more than NDC which
causes the ratio NDC/NC to increase but NDC will still exceed NC.
These results indicate that in the presence of the pure cost efﬁciency effect, the preven-
tive response to an expected recession is stronger under centralized banking than under
decentralized banking. The explanation is straightforward. Since the client targeting ac-
tivity is less efﬁcient under centralized banking, such a bank tends to be more exposed to
credit losses if a recession actually occurs. Hence, it is this type of bank which is in greater
need to cut its lending portfolio, if a recession becomes more likely to happen. Stretching
our argument a bit, we may say that banks under centralized decision-making may be
more inclined to “push the panic button” when the prospect of a recession looms large.
Let us now take a look at how these responses affect the proﬁt and risk levels in the
two banking regimes. From Table 1(b) it follows that the ratio of expected proﬁts in-
creases. This basically reﬂects that when a recession is more likely to occur, it becomes
more important than before to have a large proportion of h-entrepreneurs in the pool of
borrowers. Since the client targeting activity is more effective under decentralized bank-
ing, this favors the decentralized banking system when the likelihood of a recession is
increased.
Turning to the risk levels, the indicator “− then +” above the ratio of the total risk and
the ratio of the market risks means that the ratio ﬁrst decreases but after some level of pd,
the ratio instead increases. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
To explain the U-shaped effect on the risk ratios, observe that two opposite effects
are at work here. On the one hand, the client targeting is more effective under decentral-
ized banking, which means that for given levels of e and N, the increase in the market
risk and the total risk following a larger value of pd is relatively smaller under decen-
tralized banking than under centralized banking. For given levels of e and N, this con-













. On the other hand, when e and N change in response to the
increase in pd, then the simulations indicate that it is the bank in the centralized regime
which adjusts its choices of e and N relatively more than the bank in the decentralized
regime. This response effect works in the direction of increasing the market risk (Varm (Π))
and the total risk (Var(Π)) but these increases are smaller under centralized banking
than under decentralized banking. Hence, the response effect works in the direction of in-












(a) Ratio of total risk










(b) Ratio of market risk
Figure 3: The ratio of total risk (left) and the ratio of market risk (right) when the propor-
tion of high ability entrepreneurs is equal between regions; pure cost efﬁciency effect.
creasing the risk ratios Var(ΠDC)/Var(ΠC) and Var(ΠDC
m )/Varm(ΠC). As such, the total
effect on the market risk and the total risk in the two banking regimes is ambiguous and
our simulations indicate that the conditional effect dominates for low levels of pd whereas
the response effect dominates for larger levels of pd.
5.2 The Pure Financing Externality
Let us now turn to the ﬁnancing externality. To eliminate the diversiﬁcation effect, the
degree of risk aversion (A) is set equal to zero and to eliminate the cost efﬁciency effect,
we set the parameters αk,1 and αk,2 in the screening cost function (equation (3)) at the same
levels in the two banking regimes.
The simulation results are summarized in Table 2. As we argued earlier in the paper,
the ﬁnancing externality provides the bank in the decentralized regime with an incen-
tive to over-provide the number of loans, and this is veriﬁed in the simulations where
NDC > NC. As a consequence, the expected proﬁt is lower under decentralized banking
than under centralized banking. Another effect of the over-provision of loans is that it
reduces the decentralized bank’s screening effort (eDC < eC) because the screening cost
is increasing in N. Even though this implies that the client targeting activity is more ef-
ﬁcient in the centralized regime, this need not imply that the total risk and the market
risk are lower compared with the decentralized regime. Rather, our simulations indicate
that when the two regions are symmetric in terms of having the same proportion of h-
entrepreneurs in the population (i.e., θ1 = θ2), then the risks are lower in the centralized
regime. On the other hand, when θ1 != θ2, then the risks may be lower in the decen-
19Table 2: Summarized effects; pure ﬁnance externality.
(a) Implied relationships.
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tralized regime. This latter result can be explained by acknowledging that the centralized
bank tends to focus its resources on the less risky region. By doing so, the centralized bank
increases the variance of the proﬁt associated with the less risky region by more than it
reduces the variance in the proﬁt associated with the riskier region.
Let us now turn to the effects of an increase in the probability that a recession will
occur. These results are summarized in Table 2(b) from which we see that when the
risk of a (deep) recession increases, then e increases and N decreases in both banking
regimes (as they did in Section 5.1). However, the net effect on the ratios eDC/eC and
E(ΠDC)/E(ΠC) depends on whether the two regions in which the bank group is active
have similar (θ1 = θ2) or different proportions (θ1  = θ2) of h-entrepreneurs in their re-
spective populations. If the two regions are symmetric (θ1 = θ2) then the effect of an
increase in pd on eDC/eC is positive, but if the two regions are asymmetric (θ1  = θ2) then
the ratio eDC/eC may be increasing in pd for low levels of pd but after some critical value













, the signs in Table 2(b) are opposite to those presented in Table
1(b) in Section 5.1. The explanation is that (in contrast to the situation in Section 5.1) it is
now the bank in the decentralized regime which is less effective in its client targeting ac-
tivity. Hence, it is the decentralized bank that adjusts more strongly if the probability of a
recession increases. By using the same type of arguments as in Section 5.1, we can explain













Table 2(b) have opposite signs compared with those presented in Section 5.1. As conse-
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(b) Ratio of market risk
Figure 4: The ratio of total risk (left) and the ratio of market risk (right) when the propor-
tion of high ability entrepreneurs is equal between regions; pure ﬁnancing externality.
quence, the relationship between the risk ratios and the probability of a recession are now
featuring an inverted U-shape, as illustrated in Figure 4.
Another result is that an increase in pd has an ambiguous effect on the ratio of ex-
pected proﬁts, E(ΠDC)/E(ΠC). This is related to whether the two regions are symmetric
(θ1 = θ2) or asymmetric (θ1 != θ2). Since it is the bank in the decentralized regime which
increases its screening activity relatively more than the bank in the centralized regime
when θ1 = θ2, it follows that the subsequent increase in the proportion of h-entrepreneurs
that accompanies the increase in e tends to be larger in the decentralized regime than in
the centralized regime. As a consequence, E(ΠDC) will be reduced by a relatively smaller
amount than E(ΠC) following an increase in pd. This explains why E(ΠDC)/E(ΠC) is
increasing in pd when θ1 = θ2. On the other hand, if θ1 != θ2, this result need not hold
because when the probability of a recession becomes sufﬁciently large, the bank in the
centralized regime tends to cut back on lending altogether in the risky region whereas the
bank in the decentralized regime continues to lend. As a consequence, E(ΠC) is reduced
“faster” than E(ΠDC), resulting in an increase in the ratio E(ΠDC)/E(ΠC).
5.3 The Pure Diversiﬁcation Effect
Let us now turn to the pure diversiﬁcation effect. To eliminate the ﬁnancing externality,
the ﬁnancing function in region k is written ρ(Nk) and to eliminate the cost efﬁciency ef-
fect, the parameters in equation (3) (i.e. the screening cost function) are set at the same
levels in the two banking regimes.
The simulation results are summarized in Table 3. From Table 3(a) we see that in the
presence of only the diversiﬁcation effect, the market risk and the total risk will be smaller
21Table 3: Summarized effects; pure diversiﬁcation effect.
(a) Implied relationships.
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for the bank in the centralized regime. The reason is that when decisions are centralized,
the bank in the centralized regime has an opportunity to obtain a better diversiﬁed portfo-
lio of loans between the two regions than the bank in the decentralized regime. As can be
seen in Table 3(a), the possibility to effectively diversify between regions gives the bank
in the centralized regime an incentive to provide fewer loans compared with when the
lending decisions are uncoordinated, which is in line with the discussion in Section 4.2.3.
Another result is that since the screening cost is increasing in N, it follows that a bank in
the centralized regime will put in a larger screening effort than a bank in the decentral-
ized regime (eC > eDC). This means that the ability to be more effective in diversifying the
lending portfolio between regions leads to a more efﬁcient client targeting activity in the
centralized regime. Finally, observe that since the bank in the decentralized regime tends
to over-provide the number of loans in the presence of the pure diversiﬁcation effect, both
the expected proﬁt levels and the risk levels will be larger under decentralized banking







However, the bank group’s risk-adjusted expected proﬁt in the centralized regime will,
nevertheless, exceed that in the centralized regime (ΩC > ΩDC).
As for the effects of an increase in the probability that a recession will occur (pd), they
are summarized in Table 3(b). The intuition for these results are the same as for the corre-
sponding outcomes in Section 5.2.
225.4 The Full Model
Let us now turn to the full model where the cost efﬁciency effect, the ﬁnancing externality
and the diversiﬁcation effect are all present simultaneously. Observe that the full model is
more than just the sum of the three effects in Section 5.1 - 5.3 because we kept the degree
of risk aversion (A) equal to zero when we analyzed the cost efﬁciency effect and the ﬁ-
nance externality effect in isolation. Therefore, when all three effects are included in a full
model experiment where A > 0, we add an extra dimension to the analysis.
To achieve an easy overview of how centralized and decentralized banking may differ
when all above mentioned effects are added together, we simulate the optimal choices of
e and N using the experimental plan presented in Table 4. As can be seen, we vary ﬁve
key parameters in two levels producing a total of 25 = 32 data points. This, in turn, makes
it possible to calculate the expected proﬁt, E(Π), the total risk, Var(Π), the market risk,
Varm (Π), and the expected value of the risk-adjusted proﬁt, Ω, within the bank group for
each of the 32 data points. We also calculate the actual proﬁt levels if the market condition
turns out to be “upstate”, “normal” or “downstate” (i.e., Πu, Πn and Πd) for each of the
32 data points.
We begin the analysis by calculating the “sample average” of the 32 data points for
each variable mentioned above in the experiment. The ﬁrst two rows in Table 5 show
that the “average” value of e is larger in the decentralized regime than in the centralized
regime whereas the number of loans provided in the decentralized regime exceeds the
amount provided in the centralized regime. Since this outcome is qualitatively the same
as the one that arose in the presence of only the pure cost efﬁciency effect, it indicates that
with our choice of parameter values, the cost efﬁciency effect dominates over the ﬁnanc-
ing externality and the diversiﬁcation effect.
Let us now take a look at how these differences in behavior affect proﬁt and risk levels
in the two banking regimes. As can be seen in Table 5, the expected proﬁt (E(Π)) tends to
be larger in the centralized regime than in the decentralized regime. Although the differ-
ence is small, our simulations indicate that the negative effect on the expected proﬁt in the
decentralized regime, generated by the ﬁnancing externality and the diversiﬁcation effect,
outweighs the decentralized regime’s comparative advantage in terms of being more efﬁ-
cient in its client targeting activity. However, this is only half the story since the total risk
(Var(Π)) and the market risk (Varm (Π)) are considerably smaller in the decentralized
regime. Since the size of the market risk and the total risk depends on (i) how effective
the bank group is in its client targeting activity and (ii) how effective the bank group is in
terms of diversifying the portfolio of loans between regions, our simulations show that it
is possible for the client targeting effect to outperform the diversiﬁcation effect in terms
23Table 4: Experimental plan used for the simulations of the full model.
Variables Treatments
Risk aversion (A) 0.01 0.1
Probability of recession (pd) 0.01 0.49
Market asymmetry (θ1/θ2) 1 1.5
Relative cost efﬁciency (αC/αDC) 2 3
Financing cost (b) 10−5 10−6
Constants Value
Cost efﬁciency, centralized bank (αC) 10−7
Proportion of high-ability entrepreneurs in region 2 (θ2) 0.1
Probability of a normal state (pn) 0.5
of achieving a portfolio of loans where the market risk and the total risk are low. Hence,
our results show that even if a portfolio of loans in the decentralized regime appears to
be poorly diversiﬁed in the “classical” sense, this portfolio may nevertheless contain less
risk than a portfolio in the centralized regime which appears to be well diversiﬁed in the
“classical” sense.
Since E(Π) and Var(Π) both tend to be larger in the centralized regime, our simula-
tion results indicate that the centralized regime may deliver higher proﬁts at the expense
of higher risk. The question is then in which regime the trade-off between proﬁt and risk
is most efﬁcient. To evaluate this, we look at the simulated levels of the risk-adjusted
expected proﬁts and as can be seen in Table 5, the centralized regime, “on average”, pro-
duces a larger risk-adjusted expected proﬁt than the decentralized regime.
However, since the full model results are highly dependent on our choice of parame-
ter values, the results should be interpreted with some caution. Acknowledging this, we
now proceed to ﬁt a curve to the optimized values. Right-hand side variables in this curve
ﬁtting are pd, A, θ1/θ2, αC/αDC and b (as before, the increase in pd is matched by a corre-
sponding reduction in pu while pn is unchanged). This enables us to take a closer look at
how the two banking regimes’ respective choices of e and N, and the resulting proﬁt and
risk levels, are affected by a change in each of these exogenous variables. The results from
the curve ﬁtting are presented in Table 6 and a summary of the effects due to an increase
in the probability of a recession is given in Table 7.
We would like to emphasize the following general points. First, an increase in pd tends
to favor the decentralized banking regime in comparison with the centralized regime.











Reading off the second row in Table 6, we see that when pd increases, both the expected
proﬁt and the risk-adjusted proﬁt improves in the decentralized regime relative to the
centralized regime. Also the actual proﬁt ratios, ΠDC
j /ΠC
j , for j = u,n,d, increase with
pd. Second, if the banks become more risk-averse (i.e. A increases), this tends to favor the
decentralized banking regime because both the expected, risk-adjusted and actual proﬁt
ratios increase with A. Third, if the asymmetry increases between the two regions (i.e. the
ratio θ1/θ2 goes up), then it is more important than before to achieve an efﬁcient alloca-
tion of lending portfolios between the two regions. This favors the centralized banking
regime.
Finally, let us consider the possibility of a “black swan” hitting the economy. By that
we mean that the actual outcome turns out to be a recession (i.e. market condition down-
state) even if the probability pd was initially low. Calculating the mean ratio of the actual
proﬁt, ¯ ΠDC
d / ¯ ΠC
d , when market downstate actually occurs shows that if pd = 0.01 and
θ1 = θ2, then ¯ ΠDC
d / ¯ ΠC
d = 1.03 whereas if pd = 0.01 and θ1 != θ2, then ¯ ΠDC
d / ¯ ΠC
d = 0.96.
As such, we conclude that when the economy enters a recession (downstate) then the de-
centralized bank, “on average”, performs better if the markets are similar (when the cost
efﬁciency effect dominates). However, if the markets differ in terms of the proportion
of high ability entrepreneurs, then the centralized bank’s ability to target the less risky
market makes this bank better suited to handle an unexpected downturn in the economy.
Recall that this result appears when the risk of a deep recession is very low (pd = 0.01).
On the other hand, if the probability of a recession becomes sufﬁciently large, then our
simulations indicate that, “on average”, the decentralized bank outperforms the central-
ized bank when a recession hits the economy ( ¯ ΠDC
d / ¯ ΠC
d = 1.042), regardless of whether
25Table 6: Fitted curve parameters on ratios of the full model outcomes. We use standardized values of the variables

























Intercept 5.60 24.63 13.46 12.39 7.93 7.12 14.03 14.46 14.00
Recession prob. (pd) 0.13 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.11 −0.02 0.52 0.48 0.30
Riskaversion (A) 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.25 0.23 0.04




0.34 0.26 0.10 0.13 −0.35 −0.62 0.08 0.09 0.21
Financing cost (b) −0.40 −0.45 −0.53 −0.53 −0.44 −0.40 −0.53 −0.54 −0.56
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the markets are similar or not.
We end with some stylized facts about the Swedish banking sector and calculate the
yearly growth in operating proﬁts for the four main Swedish banks (Nordea, SEB, Sven-
ska Handelsbanken and Swedbank) during the years 2006-2010. Since Svenska Handels-
banken (SHB) is the only major Swedish bank operating under a decentralized structure,
we calculate the difference in growth rates, where a positive value indicates that the de-
centralized bank outperformed its centralized counterparts. By doing so, we are able to
relate the results in Table 6 to the effects on operating proﬁts caused by an actual recession
as well as the effects caused by an increase in the probability of recession during the next
coming ﬁscal year.
In Table 8, we present the mean difference in growth rates for three different cases.
The mean difference in growth rates when the probability of recession was high the forth-
coming ﬁscal year (2009) while the Swedish economy was in an actual recession (2008
and 2009) is presented in the upper left quadrant of the table. As can be seen, the mean
difference in grow rates is positive, indicating that the decentralized bank performed bet-
ter during these circumstances. Revisiting Table 6, while acknowledging that an increase
in pd affects the ratio ΠDC
d /ΠC
d positively, this ﬁnding is fully in line with the predic-
tions from our theoretical model. Turning to the lower right quadrant of Table 8, we ﬁnd
that this difference is negative, indicating that the centralized banks (Nordea, SEB, Swed-
bank) tends to have a larger growth in operating proﬁts, compared the decentralized bank
(SHB), when the probability of a recession is low in the case of economic growth. Since
our model predicts that a decrease in pd tends to decrease the ratio ¯ ΠDC
u / ¯ ΠC
u, also this
result is predicted by the theoretical model.
Finally, we turn to the case of when a “black swan” hits an economy, i.e. the case when
the probability of a recession was low the forthcoming ﬁscal year but when the economy,
nonetheless, entered a recession during the year of operations. As previously discussed,
our theoretical ﬁndings concerning such a case are rather ambiguous and highly depen-
27Table 8: Mean difference in growth rates in operating proﬁts from 2006-2010 for the four
major Swedish banks. Source: Datastream.





dent on if the proportion of high ability entrepreneurs are equal across regions or not. If
θ1 = θ2, our results indicate that the decentralized bank tends to handle a “black swan”
more efﬁciently while if θ1  = θ2, a bank operating under a centralized regime tends to out-
perform its decentralized counterpart. Returning to Table 8, and acknowledging that the
mean difference in growth rates displayed in the upper right quadrant represents such a
case, we ﬁnd this mean difference to be positive. Since this suggests that the decentralized
bank (SHB) tends to outperform its competitors, in relative terms, when an unexpected
recession hits the economy; this ﬁnding suggests that SHB operates in markets character-
ized by a similar proportion of high performing entrepreneurs.
6 Concluding Remarks
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that attempts to simultaneously address the ques-
tion of how screening and lending decisions differ between banks having a centralized
and decentralized decision-making structure. To analyze this issue, we develop a model
where centralized and decentralized banks differ in three aspects; (i) the cost efﬁciency
related to the screening of potential borrowers, (ii) the presence of a ﬁnancing externality
which arises because of lack of coordination when the lending decisions are decentralized
and (iii) the inability to effectively diversifying the portfolio of loans between regions un-
der decentralized decision-making.
We emphasize three main conclusions. First, in the presence of only the cost efﬁ-
ciency effect, decentralized banks will lend more funds and have lower risks than their
centralized counterparts. It is also shown that in the presence of the pure cost efﬁciency
effect, the bank in the centralized regime tend to react stronger than the bank in the de-
centralized regime, in terms of reducing the lending portfolio, in the wake of a recession.
Second, when only the ﬁnancing externality is present, then decentralized banks tend to
over-provide loans while reducing the amount of effort put into the screening procedure,
in comparison with centralized banking. This implies that the pure ﬁnancing external-
28ity produces lower proﬁts and higher risks under decentralized banking. Third, the pure
diversiﬁcation effect also favors centralized banking in the sense that the client targeting
is more efﬁcient, the expected proﬁt larger and risks lower, compared with decentralized
banking.
We also simulate a model where the cost efﬁciency effect, the ﬁnancing externality
and the diversiﬁcation effect are present simultaneously. This allows us to study how
these three effects combine to jointly inﬂuence the comparison between the two banking
regimes. Here, we would like to emphasize that our results show that the client targeting
effect may outperform the diversiﬁcation effect in terms of achieving a portfolio of loans
where the market risk and the total risk is low. As such, a portfolio of loans that appears
to be poorly diversiﬁed under decentralized banking may actually contain less risk than
a portfolio chosen by the bank in the centralized regime under the same conditions.
However, there are conditions that, in relative terms, are favorable to a particular lend-
ing regime’s risk-return proﬁle. Asymmetric markets (in terms of the proportion of high
ability entrepreneurs) tend to favor centralized banking while decentralized banks are fa-
vored by an increase in the probability of a recession. In addition, our results indicate that
decentralized banks are favored by an increase in risk aversion.
Futureresearchmaytakeseveraldirections. Forexample, aninterestingavenuewould
be to analyze how centralized and decentralized banking perform under different market
forms. What are the proﬁt and risk levels under oligopoly and in a perfectly competi-
tive banking market? Another question that would be interesting to address is what the
outcome would be in an duopoly where one bank has a centralized organizational struc-
ture whereas the other uses a decentralized decision-making. Will the aggregate risks in
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31Appendix: Simulation procedure
We use the Mathematica function FindMaximum for the simulations presented in Section
5, using algorithms suitable for constrained numerical optimization (Nelder and Mead,
1965; Mehrotra, 1992). We proceed as follows.
First, we deﬁne the necessary functions from Section 3 and 4 and give the exogenous
parameters of the model some suitable value. For the centralized bank, we then solve for
optimal values of eC
k and NC
k by calling on the FindMaximum command on equation (5).
This gives us the numerical global optimum of ΩC as well as E(ΠC),Var(ΠC),Varm(ΠC).
We then let the actual outcome of high ability entrepreneurs in region k be Z(eC
k ). By do-
ing so, we are able to call on the functions from Section 4 in order to calculate the actual
proﬁt for each market condition (ΠC
j ).
Turningtotheconstrainednumericaloptimizationproblemforthedecentralizedbank,
we acknowledge that the regional banks play a non-cooperative Nash game vis-a-vis each
other. Thus, we start with the bank in region 1 and call on the FindMaximum command
on equation (9), solving for the optimal levels of eDC
1 and NDC
1 , using given start values
for eDC
2 and NDC
2 . We then apply the FindMaximum command on equation (9) for the
local bank in region 2, while using the (conditionally) optimal values of eDC
1 and NDC
1 as
given. This is followed by new numerical solution of the the bank in region 1’s maxi-
mization problem, using the (conditionally) optimal values of eDC
2 and NDC
2 as given. This






call on the functions from Section 4 in order to calculate E(ΠDC),Var(ΠDC),Varm(ΠDC).
The same procedure as for the centralized bank is then used in order to derive the actual
outcome in each market condition (ΠDC
j ).
In Table A.1, we present the parameter values used for the simulations in Sections
5.1 - 5.3. Here, we solve for the optimal values using the method discussed above, over
the span pd ∈ [0.01,0.49] in increments of 0.01. We let an increase in pd correspond to a
decrease in pu such that pu = 1−(pn + pd). In addition to the parameter values presented
in Table A.1, we have checked for robustness of the results by using a wide range of
parameters in the simulations, all yielding the same qualitative results.
32Table A.1: Parameter values used for the simulations in Sections 5.1 - 5.3.
Variables Value
Risk aversion (A) 0 or 0.01
Proportion of high-ability entrepreneurs in region 1 (θ1) 0.1 and 0.2
Proportion of high-ability entrepreneurs in region 2 (θ2) 0.1
Cost efﬁciency, centralized bank (αC) 10−7
Cost efﬁciency, decentralized bank (αDC) 10−7 or 5× 10−8
Financing cost (b) 10−5 and 10−6
Probability of a normal state (pn) 0.5
Project rate of returns Value
r
h,u
k 0.6
r
h,l
k 0.5
r
n,u
k 0.6
r
n,l
k 0.6
r
d,u
k 0.5
r
d,l
k 0
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